En el ámbito del derecho procesal penal, particularmente en el contexto del tránsito, existe una carencia de disposiciones legales que regulen el aspecto probatorio para demostrar infracciones por parte de las autoridades competentes. Específicamente, la falta de regulación sobre el uso de fotografías o videos como evidencia dificulta el proceso de aplicación de la ley, ya que ni el COIP ni la LOTTTSV ni sus reglamentos abordan adecuadamente cómo deben obtenerse pruebas mediante medios digitales. Esta laguna normativa plantea interrogantes sobre (...) qué aspectos pueden capturarse en contenido digital, cómo llevar a cabo dicho proceso y qué requisitos deben cumplir los dispositivos utilizados. Ante esta situación, se justifica la necesidad de realizar una investigación exhaustiva para determinar qué aspectos deben incorporarse en la normativa de tránsito con el fin de garantizar un debido proceso. El objetivo principal de esta investigación fue identificar las deficiencias en la regulación del aspecto probatorio en casos de infracciones de tránsito, así como proponer recomendaciones para mejorar el marco normativo existente. Se buscó determinar qué aspectos deben ser incorporados en la normativa de tránsito para garantizar un debido proceso y una aplicación justa de la ley. Para abordar esta problemática, se llevó a cabo una investigación cualitativa con un enfoque descriptivo. Se empleó el método dogmático-jurídico analítico-sintético para analizar en detalle la legislación existente y las lagunas normativas relacionadas con la obtención de pruebas digitales en casos de infracciones de tránsito. Además, se realizaron entrevistas a expertos en derecho procesal penal y se recopiló información de jurisprudencia relevante. Este enfoque metodológico permitió una comprensión profunda de los desafíos y las posibles soluciones en este ámbito. Los resultados de la investigación revelaron importantes lagunas en la regulación del aspecto probatorio en casos de infracciones de tránsito. Se identificaron problemas relacionados con la falta de claridad en los procedimientos de obtención de pruebas digitales y la ausencia de criterios específicos para la admisibilidad de dichas pruebas en los procesos legales. Además, se destacó la necesidad de establecer estándares claros y procedimientos adecuados para garantizar la integridad y fiabilidad de la evidencia digital en el contexto del tránsito. Esta investigación resalta la importancia de abordar las deficiencias en la regulación del aspecto probatorio en casos de infracciones de tránsito. Se recomienda la implementación de medidas específicas para mejorar la recopilación y admisibilidad de pruebas digitales, así como la revisión y actualización de la normativa existente. Esto contribuirá a garantizar un proceso legal justo y transparente en el ámbito del tránsito, fortaleciendo así el Estado de derecho y la confianza en el sistema judicial. (shrink)

This paper argues for a dilemma: you can accept liberalism or immigration restrictions, but not both. More specifically, the standard arguments for restricting freedom of movement apply equally to textbook liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, religion, occupation and reproductive choice. We begin with a sketch of liberalism’s core principles and an argument for why freedom of movement is plausibly on a par with other liberal freedoms. Next we argue that, if a state’s right to self-determination grounds a prima (...) facie right to restrict immigration, then it also grounds a prima facie right to restrict freedom of speech, religion, sexual choice and more. We then suggest that the social costs associated with freedom of immigration are also costs associated with occupational choice, speech and reproduction. Thus, a state’s interest in reducing these costs gives it prima facie justification to restrict not only immigration but also other core liberal freedoms. Moreover, we rebut the objection that, even if the standard arguments for a prima facie right to restrict immigration also support a prima facie right to restrict liberal freedoms generally, there are differences that render immigration restrictions – but not restrictions on speech, religion, etc. – justified all things considered. In closing, we suggest that the theoretical price of supporting immigration restrictions – viz., compromising a commitment to liberal principles – is too steep to pay. (shrink)

Many political theorists argue that immigration restrictions are unjust and defend broadly open borders. In this paper, I examine the implications of this view for individual conduct. In particular, I argue that the citizens of states that enforce unjust immigration restrictions have duties to disobey certain immigration laws. States conscript their citizens to help enforce immigration law by imposing legal duties on these citizens to monitor, report, and refrain from interacting with unauthorized migrants. If an ideal of open borders is (...) true, these laws are unjust. Furthermore, if citizens comply with their legal duties, they contribute to violating the rights of migrants. We are obligated to refrain from contributing to rights-violations. So, citizens are obligated to disobey immigration laws. I defend the moral requirement to disobey immigration laws against the objection that disobedience to the law is excessively risky and the objection that citizens have political obligations to obey the law. (shrink)

Are properties universal or particular? According to Universalism, properties are universals because there is a certain fundamental tie that makes properties capable of being shareable by more than one thing. On the opposing side, Particularism is the view that properties are particulars due to the existence of a fundamental tie that makes properties incapable of being shared. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the connections between the notions of the fundamental tie and universality and particularity. I argue, (...) first, that universality and particularity can characterize a property if and only if there is a universalist or a particularist fundamental tie, and, second, that it is unclear that these should be the fundamental ties that connect ordinary and scientific properties to their respective bearers. Then I develop an alternative approach to properties and the fundamental tie, which is neutralist because it dispenses with universality and particularity as features of properties, and naturalist because it naturalizes the possession of properties by replacing metaphysical fundamental ties with a scientific one, in particular, a physical process. I show how this approach improves our understanding of properties and instantiation. (shrink)

Derek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events. Yet some critics, particularly Mark Johnston, have raised powerful objections to Parfit’s reductionism. In this paper, I defend reductionism against Johnston. In particular, I defend a radical form of reductionism that Buddhist philosophers developed. Buddhist reductionism can justify key features of Parfit’s position, such as the claims (...) that personal identity is not what matters and can also be indeterminate. Furthermore, Buddhist reductionism can avoid Johnston’s objections to Parfit’s reductionism. I conclude that reductionists have good reasons to favor Buddhist reductionism over Parfit’s version. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that (...) could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare. (shrink)

Several political theorists argue that states have rights to self-determination and these rights justify immigration restrictions. Call this: the self-determination argument for immigration restrictions. In this article, I develop an objection to the self-determination argument. I argue that if it is morally permissible for states to restrict immigration because they have rights to self-determination, then it can also be morally permissible for states to deport and denationalize their own citizens. We can either accept that it is permissible for states to (...) deport and denationalize their own citizens or reject the self-determination argument. To avoid this implication, we should reject the self-determination argument. That is, we should also reject the conclusion that rights to self-determination can justify any significant immigration restrictions. (shrink)

Categories play a major role in contemporary metaphysics. They have not only been invoked in a number of philosophical theories but are themselves objects of epistemological and metaphysical scrutiny. In this article, we will discuss the following questions: How do we know when something belongs to a certain category? Is there a fundamental category of the world? Can we give a satisfactory account of the number of categories and the completeness of systems of categories? Are categories the genuine subjects of (...) ontology? (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople smugglers help transport migrants across international borders without authorization and in return for compensation. Many people object to people smuggling and believe that the smuggling of migrants is an evil trade. In this paper, I offer a qualified defense of people smuggling. In particular, I argue that people smuggling that assists refugees in escaping threats to their rights can be morally justified. I then rebut the objections that people smugglers exploit migrants, have defective motivations, and wrongly violate the law. (...) My conclusion is that people smuggling is sometimes a permissible way of helping refugees to evade unjust immigration restrictions and compelling states to bear their fair share of the global refugee population. (shrink)

A large body of evidence suggests that the Personalized System of Instruction (PSI) improves learning. In courses that use PSI, the material is divided into units, students must pass a test on each unit before advancing to the next unit, there’s no group-level instruction, and students advance in the course at their own pace. While studies find that PSI improves learning outcomes in a wide range of settings, researchers haven’t studied the effectiveness of PSI in critical thinking classes. In this (...) paper, I argue that teaching critical thinking with PSI can effectively promote critical thinking skills. I describe a course that uses PSI to teach critical thinking and I present evidence from pre- and post-tests that indicates that students substantially improved their reasoning skills in this course. I also discuss the costs and drawbacks of using this method of instruction and consider ways of addressing these problems. (shrink)

1. Categories and the Scientific Turn of Metaphysics: The Notion of World-Fundamentality What are the fundamental inhabitants of the world? This question, as old as it is new, is about the fundamental structure of our world. Is our world a world of Aristotle's ordinary substances, Locke's physical substances, Husserl's wholes, Wittgenstein's facts, Sellars's processes, or Quine's sets? In order to distinguish the sort of metaphysical fundamentality at stake in this discussion from other possible types of fundamentality, I shall call it (...) from now on "world-fundamentality." In this article I want to make a proposal in the context of this metaphysical dispute. The proposal is the addition of a new criterion of world-fundamentality to the existing catalog of independence and simplicity, among some other prominent classical examples. I call this criterion "the materialist criterion of world-fundamentality" because it states that metaphysicians should not decide the question of whether our world is a world of facts rather than a world of sets or other categories without considering the explanatory power of such categories to account for the relation between "the manifest image" and "the scientific image," to use the words of Wilfrid Sellars. (shrink)

Is structure a fundamental and indispensable part of the world? Is the question of ontology a question about structure? Structure is a central notion in contemporary metaphysics [Sider 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press]. Realism about structure claims that the question of ontology is about the fundamental and indispensable structure of the world. In this paper, I present a criticism of the metaphysics of realism about structure based on a version of Russell’s famous regress argument against (...) nominalism [Russell 1911. “On the Relation of Universals and Particular.” In Logic & Knowledge. Reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin]. First, I argue that the three general tests for the fundamentality of structure proposed by realism about structure rely on a particular empirical test for structure, namely, the so-called ‘similarity test for structure.’ Second, I argue that the similarity test is not well-founded because it leads to a vicious regress. Third, I argue that the regress affects the whole metaphysics of realism about structure, and that no structural notion can be said to be fundamental in connection with any of the other tests. Lastly, I argue that the question of ontology as a question about structure is not substantive. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend a naturalistic approach to instantiation and the Principle of Instantiation. I argue that the instantiation of an ordinary property F consists of two coordinated relationships at the levels of the manifest and scientific images, namely, constituency and entailment. Also, I offer an account of the Principle of Instantiation related to this conception of instantiation based on the notion of scientific prediction.

Many people think that citizenship should not be for sale. On their view, it is morally wrong for states to sell citizenship to foreigners. In this article, I challenge this view. I argue that it is in principle permissible for states to sell citizenship. I contend that, if states can permissibly deny foreigners access to citizenship in some cases, then states can permissibly give foreigners the option of buying citizenship in these cases. Furthermore, I defend the permissibility of selling citizenship (...) against the objections that selling citizenship values citizenship in the wrong way, corrupts civic norms, and unfairly discriminates against poor foreigners. I conclude by noting that, although selling citizenship is not intrinsically wrong, it could still be wrong for states to sell citizenship in practice. If existent immigration restrictions are unjust, then it may be impermissible for states to sell citizenship in the real world. (shrink)

States have rights to unilaterally determine their own immigration policies under international law and few international institutions regulate states’ decision-making about immigration. As a result, states have extensive discretion over immigration policy. In this paper, I argue that states should join international migration institutions that would constrain their discretion over immigration. Immigration restrictions are morally risky. When states restrict immigration, they risk unjustly harming foreigners and restricting their freedom. Furthermore, biases and epistemic defects pervasively influence states’ decision-making about immigration policy. (...) States should transfer some of their decision-making authority over immigration to more reliable institutions in order to mitigate the risks that they will unjustly restrict immigration. International institutions that include the interests of potential immigrants would be more reliable with respect to immigration policy than unilateral state decision-making. Thus, states should subject their immigration policies to international control. (shrink)

We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer two novel solutions to two perennial problems of categorial ontology, namely, the problem of the categorial structure: how are the categories related to one another? And the problem of categorial completeness: how is the completeness of a proposed list of categories justified? First, I argue that a system of categories should have a structure such that there is a most basic category that is a bearer of all other categories and that has (...) what I shall call “combinatorial conditions”. To do so, I compare this approach to categorial structure with the approaches given by substantialist, mereological, factualist, and geo ontologies. Second, I argue that the problem of categorial completeness is only a problem for certain ontologies. In this connection, I explore views on categorial completeness proposed by substantialists and geo-ontologists. Lastly, I conclude that factualism does a better job of accounting for categorial structure and categorial completeness than other categorial ontologies. (shrink)

This is a brief guide to learn about our environment, from front-page news to controversial topics such as euthanasia and surrogate motherhood, and other more thorny ones such as death, life, love or grief. Everything you will find in these pages, written by the professor of Ethics and Philosophy, focuses on a single maxim: learning to live in harmony with oneself and the environment, avoiding empty speculation and empty talk, something that can only be achieved if we learn to think (...) for ourselves. "Everyday life is complicated because we have divinized the means and impoverished the ends. We should love ourselves more and contemplate others as companions on the same journey, distancing ourselves from the deified power and imbecility that surrounds us," summarizes the philosopher, pointing out the lack of critical judgment and common sense that lead us to be permanently mediatized and deceived. (shrink)

The Sellarsian task of ontology is to reconcile two seemingly divergent images of ordinary objects such as persons, tomatoes and tables, namely, the manifest image of common sense and the scientific image provided by fundamental physics (Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, 1963). Can the genuine categories of the ontologies of Substantialism (Heil, The World as We Find It, 2012), Structural Realism (Ladyman and Ross,Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, 2007; French, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, 2014), and (...) Factualism (Cumpa, ‘A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2014), such as ‘substance’, ‘structure’, and ‘fact’, help us to solve the problem of the reconciliation of the two images of ordinary objects? In this paper I defend the thesis that the ontology of Factualism does a better job of reconciling the manifest and the scientific images of ordinary objects than other ontologies. (shrink)

Consider two similarity facts: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G. According to the Platonist approach to similarity, the analysis of such facts forces us to admit that similarity facts are to be analyzed into facts about universal similarities of the form: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G, where similarity is a universal. In this paper, (...) I defend Neutralism, a view according to which there are properties and similarities, but these are not universals, particulars, or of other categories. After presenting the Platonist analysis of similarity proposed by Russell and Grossmann, I examine the question of whether or not the Platonist analysis of similarity leads us inevitably to a conception of similarity as a universal. Then I offer a novel, alternative analysis of similarity free of commitment to universals. (shrink)

Argumentation is a cognitive process of reconstruction that occurs in the discursive proximal space. Multimodal argumentation, from a cognitive-semiotic perspective, suggests that certain multimodal structures can lead audiences to an accurate mental representation of argumentation, depending on the knowledge possessed, codes and signs employed (modes), and context. It is not necessary to have a formal standardized and verbal structure. We are able to argue effectively with others without the need for verbal translation, taking into account the semiotic interpretation of the (...) message. (shrink)

This paper investigates the role that universities play in supporting social entrepreneurs (SEs) across their ecosystem. Adopting the resource-based view (RBV) approach, we argue that universities attract, mobilize, and deploy multiple resources that benefit SEs through four main mechanisms (i.e., teaching, research, outreach, and the development of partnerships). We use a qualitative approach of 62 semi-structured interviews and 8 focus groups in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. Our contribution shows that employing different resources and engaging in supportive activities of universities towards (...) SEs facilitate the development of university capabilities, such as an increased reputation, development of leadership skills for students and staff, and wider access to ecosystem resources that support other university activities related to teaching, research, and community outreach. The role that partnerships play in the development of these capabilities is fundamental, thanks to the different strategic alliances and mobilization of resources between universities and other actors while supporting SEs. This study contributes to our understanding of the role universities can play to intensify the nature of supportive ecosystems for SEs. This contribution is relevant not only to academics but also to practitioners, as this will shed light on the building, development, and scaling of a supportive ecosystem for SEs. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to clarify what is properly common to the common good and to support its irreducibility as a guarantee of overcoming an atomistic conception of civil society. We begin by addressing the notion of individual freedom and the questioning of the selfish condition of the human being. Then, we delve into the normative possibilities offered by an ethical interpretation of the common good. The difference of the common good from other notions used in late-modern discourses (...) is key in determining the intrinsic commonality of social relations. In concluding, we argue for a conception of the common good that accommodates individual freedom, understanding it no longer in isolation, but as part of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Several noted economists and prominent international organizations have recently advocated for the implementation of guest worker programs in developed states. Their primary argument is that guest worker programs would serve as a powerful mechanism for reducing global poverty and inequality. For example, economist Dani Rodrik estimates that guest worker programs in wealthy states would generate $200 billion or more annually for poor countries. According to Rodrik, liberalizing the temporary movement of workers would “produce the largest possible gains for the world (...) economy and for poor countries in particular,” in comparison with other policies, such as trade liberalization. (shrink)

In this paper, we look at installation art through the lens provided by the notion of “affective artifact” (Piredda 2019). We argue that affective character is central to some works of installation art and that some of those works can expand our knowledge of our affective lives, while others can contribute to the construction of our identities. Sections (2), (3), and (4) set the stage for our discussion of affective installation artworks by, respectively, situating it within the debate on affective (...) artifacts, looking at some general issues concerning the affective character of artworks, and sketching out a view of the ontology of installation art. In section (5), we discuss the affective character of six works of installation art. In section (6), we show how those artworks can reveal aspects of who we are. Section (7) concludes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158 Feminist Studies 46, no. 1. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. María Fernanda Olarte-Sierra and Tania Pérez-Bustos Careful Speculations: Toward a Caring Science of Forensic Genetics in Colombia Feminist Science and Technology Studies (STS) has recently opened up the question of care as a set of practices related to the sustainability of life.1 The field of feminist studies more broadly has extensively 1. This literature mostly comes from (...) Northern contexts and started to flourish with the seminal work of María Puig de la Bellacasa, “Matters of Care in Technoscience: Assembling Neglected Things,” Social Studies of Science 41, no. 1 (2010): 85–106. This essay gathers scattered feminist STS reflections on these issues and looks at them through the lens of care, including authors such as Susan Leigh Star, Donna Haraway, Isabelle Stengers, Hilary Rose, and Annemarie Mol. The concept of care orienting this exercise of rereading these authors is proposed by Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring,” in Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women’s Lives, ed. Emily K. Abel and Margaret K. Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 35–62. Before and after that essay came out, Puig de la Bellacasa published several other papers related to this issue, including “Touching Technologies, Touching Visions. The Reclaiming of Sensorial Experience and the Politics of Speculative Thinking,” Subjectivity 28, no. 1 (2009): 297–315; “‘Nothing Comes without Its World’: Thinking with Care,” The Sociological Review 60, no. 2 (2012): 197– 216; “Ethical Doings in Naturecultures,” Ethics, Place & Environment 13, no. 2 (2010): 151–69; “Making Time for Soil: Technoscientific Futurity and the Pace of Care,” Social Studies of Science 45, no. 5 (2015): 691–716; and Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than Human Worlds (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017). All these publications have been widely cited by other authors, particularly in a special issue of Social Studies of Science on the politics of care published in 2015 (volume 45, issue 5). Other examples María Fernanda Olarte-Sierra and Tania Pérez-Bustos 159 studied how care, and associated practices such as transnational care chains, are feminized and precarious—involving an ethos embodied by those who actively work to maintain or preserve another’s life. Feminists have focused on the politics of care embedded in invisible jobs related to aesthetics, domestic work, child and elder care, and sexual activities and see all these tasks as related to the reproduction of life and culture.2 Central to this conceptualization of care is the understanding that these jobs are typically women’s work. There is a common association between this care and notions of “motherhood” as it relates to values such as compassion, love, and respect, which have been constructed as universally feminine. However, the main goal of feminist studies of care has been to deconstruct this association, particularly because it is imbued with the white, wealthy, heteronormative ideal of femininity that underlies a gendered division of labor. The reality is that class, race, nation, and gender determine who cares for whom, whether or not labor is paid, and to what extent care is exploitative. One strand of recent research problematizes both valorizing and criticizing care practices on the grounds that they are based on a rather homogeneous understanding of the feminine. Instead, these scholars seek to resurrect valuable feminist work without relying on essentialism of authors contributing to this discussion on care as an ethos for science include Ruth Müller and Martha Kenney, “Agential Conversations: Interviewing Postdoctoral Life Scientists and the Politics of Mundane Research Practices,” Science as Culture 24, no. 4 (2014): 537–59; Charis Thompson, Good Science: The Ethical Choreography of Stem Cell Research (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013); and Carrie Friese, “Realizing Potential in Translational Medicine: The Uncanny Emergence of Care as Science,” Current Anthropology 54 (S7): S129-S138. 2. From Latin America, see, for example, Luz Gabriela Arango Gaviria, Adira Amaya Urquijo, Tania Pérez-Bustos, and Javier Pineda Duque, eds., Género y cuidado: teorías, escenarios y políticas (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2018); Pascale Molinier and Luz Grabriela Arango Gaviria, eds., El trabajo y... (shrink)

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the (...) factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Suppose that it was possible to teletransport. The teletransporter would destroy your old brain and body and construct an identical brain and body at a new location. Would you survive teletransportation? Many people think that teletransportation would kill you. On their view, the person that emerges from the teletransporter would be a replica of you, but it wouldn't be you. In contrast, I argue that there's no relevant difference between teletransportation and ordinary survival. So, if you survive ordinary life, then (...) you survive teletransportation. Yet my argument may also show that we have little prudential reason to care about our survival in general. (shrink)

I am very grateful to the five commentators for taking the time to respond to my article ‘The Active Recruitment of Health Workers: A Defense’.1 I have learned a great deal from each of their commentaries, and I am sorry to say that I will be unable to address all their important comments and criticisms in detail. In this response, I will focus on replying to the commentators’ major objections.In my paper, I suggested that the emigration of health workers from (...) poor countries might not have harmful effects on health outcomes in general, or may only have relatively small negative effects in a wide range of cases. Several commentators challenge my analysis. Carwyn Rhys Hooper suggests that it is prima facie plausible that the emigration of health workers causes harm, and that there is insufficient evidence to reject this claim.2 Gilian Brock3 and Iain Bassington4 argue that my paper failed to consider the full range of possible harms that the active recruitment of health workers brings about. These commentators are correct in that we need more evidence about the effects of migration, and that it may be too soon to arrive at the all-things-considered judgment that the emigration of health workers does not generally enable serious harm.Nonetheless, I believe that the active recruitment of health workers is still permissible. For one thing, I am less confident than Brock that the empirical research on skilled migration clearly establishes that the migration of skilled professionals causes harm to sending countries. There is a sizable body of empirical research that is inconsistent with many of Brock's claims. It is not obvious that the emigration of skilled workers depletes human capital in the sending country.5 ,6 In fact, there is evidence that the opportunity to emigrate …. (shrink)

Intelligent Transportation Systems are expected to automate how parking slots are booked by trucks. The intrinsic dynamic nature of this problem, the need of explanations and the inclusion of private data justify an agent-based solution. Agents solving this problem act with a Believe Desire Intentions reasoning, and are implemented with JASON. Privacy of trucks becomes protected sharing a list of parkings ordered by preference. Furthermore, the process of assigning parking slots takes into account legal requirements on breaks and driving time (...) limits. Finally, the agent simulations use the distances, the number of trucks and parkings corresponding to the proportions of the current European Union data. The performance of the proposed solution is tested in these simulations with three different distances against an alternative with complete knowledge. The difference in efficiency, the number of illegal breaks and the traveled distances are measured in them. Comparing the results, we can conclude that the nonprivate alternative is slightly better in performance while both alternatives do not produce illegal breaks. In this way the simulations show that the proposed privacy protection does not impose a relevant handicap in efficiency. (shrink)

In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense. Recently, some philosophers have offered philosophical reconstructions of Buddhist Personalism. In this paper, I critically evaluate one philosophical reconstruction of Buddhist Personalism according to which persons are irreducible to the parts that constitute them. Instead, persons are emergent entities and have novel properties that are distinct from the properties of their constituents. While this emergentist interpretation (...) is an interesting and well-motivated reconstruction of the Personalist position, I ultimately reject it on substantive grounds. I distinguish between different kinds of emergentism in the contemporary philosophical literature and show that they fail to support Buddhist Personalism. I thus conclude that Buddhist Personalism is untenable if it’s committed to emergentism about persons. This paper also indirectly defends Buddhist Reductionism by showing that it has crucial advantages over Buddhist Personalism. (shrink)

The metaphysics of ordinary objects is an increasingly vibrant field of study for philosophers. This volume gathers insights from a number of leading authors, who together tackle the central issues in contemporary debates about the subject. Their essays engage with topics including composition, persistence, perception, categories, images, artifacts, truthmakers, metaontology, and the relationship between the manifest and scientific images. Exploring the nature of everyday things, the contributors situate their arguments and the latest research against the background of the field's development. (...) Moreover, many essays propose new ideas and approaches, looking ahead to the future of the metaphysical study of ordinary objects. Featuring numerous clearly explained examples and with thoughtful links drawn to other, related disciplines such as pragmatism, this wide-ranging volume fills a major gap in the literature and will be important for scholars working in metaphysics. (shrink)

Some bioethicists and political philosophers argue that rich states should restrict the immigration of health workers from poor countries in order to prevent harm to people in these countries. In this essay, I argue that restrictions on the immigration of health workers are unjust, even if this immigration results in bad health outcomes for people in poor countries. I contend that negative duties to refrain from interfering with the occupational liberties of health workers outweighs rich states' positive duties to prevent (...) harm to people in sending countries. Furthermore, I defend this claim against the objection that health workers in poor countries acquire special duties to their compatriots that render them liable to coercive interference. (shrink)

Reinhardt Grossmann is one of the most sophisticated, knowledgeable and original contemporary metaphysicians. Although he was a student of Bergmann, he influenced the development of Bergmann's metaphysics considerably. No philosopher other than Grossmann defends perception to that degree against the persistent skeptical arguments. He characterizes his epistemological positions as radical empiricism and radical realism. By realism Grossmann mainly means the view that the material things we perceive exist. It is thus also an ontological position and closely related to his empiricism. (...) Grossmann's empiricism is radical insofar as he claims that entities of all categories are perceptible, even numbers and universals. Grossmann's universal realism advocates a theory of abstract categories against the current naturalism. He distinguishes between the world and the physical universe. The latter is the domain of science; the former is the subject of ontology. (shrink)

Trabajar por la construcción de la paz, promover una educación de calidad para todos, y conceder mayor atención a las necesidades especiales de los países en situaciones de conflicto y crisis, son tres de los diecisiete objetivos de la Agenda 2030 de la Unesco. Pero ¿Quién y cómo lo hará posible? Tenemos una tarea. Hoy, aquí, desde este escenario que promueve el libre pensamiento desde la filosofía teórica y práctica, estamos haciendo una parte de la tarea. Si no lo hacemos (...) nosotros o pensamos que no se puede hacer, alguien más lo hará. A través de la historia muchos han sido los pensadores, cuya inspiración ha trascendido en el tiempo, llamando nuestra atención, causando reflexión, y hasta molestia. El primero va dirigido a quienes somos conscientes de que la educación de calidad solo es posible en un entorno de paz, y, el segundo señala a quienes la paz les incomoda, el concepto de educación les es indiferente, pero el de turbulencia les suena más familiar. (shrink)